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The Challenges of Comparative Consumer
Insolvencies
Jacob Ziegel*
I.

A New Branch of Comparative Law

This paper is about a new branch of comparative law, comparative
consumer insolvency law, and its challenges. Comparative consumer
insolvency law is at best only twenty-five years old and for a very good
reason. Before the 1980s, most countries did not perceive consumer
insolvencies as a significant social, legal and economic problem, and
even fewer gave it much legislative attention. That neglect was also
shared by most insolvency text writers and academics, with the exception
of American authors among whom this topic has attracted attention for a
much longer period.
All this has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the
following random statistics. Beginning with my own country, Canada,
as late as 1972, the number of individual non-business bankruptcies,
3,647, was smaller than the number of business bankruptcies. It grew
rapidly thereafter and reached 21,025 in 1980.1 Between 1985 and 1997,
the number of consumer insolvencies increased by over 300 percent,
from 19,752 to 90,034.2 In 2001, the total number of individual filings
* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Toronto. Warm appreciation to Ryan
Lavallee, Joint MBA-JD University of Toronto student, for valuable research and
editorial assistance.
1. Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB), International Consumer
Insolvency Statistics (Ottawa, June 1999) 2 [hereafter InternationalStatistics].
2. There was a drop of nearly 10% in the number of Canadian consumer
insolvencies between 1997 and 1998 (from 90,034 to 82,620) and a 3.7% increase in the
US figures (from 1,350,118 to 1,398,182) as compared with a 20% increase in the US
figures between 1996 and 1997. See InternationalStatistics,supra note 1, at 1, 3, 7. The
improvement in the Canadian employment position and the general buoyancy of the
Canadian economy may explain the drop in the Canadian figures, although this is only
speculation. The steep rise in the US insolvency figures throughout the 1990s shows that
a robust economy is no harbinger of lower insolvency filings. Prof. Ausubel argues that
credit industry standards, especially on the credit card side, are more important factors.
See L.M. Ausubel, Credit CardDefaults, CreditCard Profits, and Bankruptcy (1997) 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 249.
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amounted to 102,539. 3 The U.S. figures tell a similar story. Between
1985 and 1997, the number of consumer insolvencies grew from 341,233
to 1,350,118, also a three-fold increase. The number has continued to
climb and reached 1,452,129 in 2001 and 1.6 million in 2003. 4 Still
more significant. is the increase in the number of consumer insolvencies
as a ratio of population. In Canada, the ratio increased between 1981 and
1997 from 0.93 to 3.00 per 1,000 of population, an increase of 223%.
The comparable figures for the U.S. were 1.4 and 5.1, an increase of
264%.
The number of insolvencies in other jurisdictions was much smaller.
Nevertheless, they too show a very significant percentage increase
between 1985 and 1997. During this period, the number of personal
insolvencies in England and Wales grew from 6,776 to 24,441 and from
a ratio of 0.14 to 0.47, a 235% increase. 6 The number of personal
insolvencies was 30,587. at the end of 2002. The number has continued
to grow and amounted to 10,271 in the third quarter of 2003. 7 The
number of Australian personal insolvencies .grew from 8,761 in 1986/7 to
22,333 in 1996/7, a 150% increase. 8 The ratio per head of population
3. "Total individual filings" comprises individual bankruptcies and Division 1 and
2 proposals by individuals. There were 87,302 individual bankruptcy filings, of which
9.1% were individual business filings and 90.9% (79,317) individual consumer filings.
There were 1,721 individual Division 1 filings, of which 72.2% (1,243) were individual
consumer filings. Of the 13,453 individual Division 2 filings all but 4% were individual
consumer filings. Information supplied in email message to author from Stephanie
Cavanagh, OSB analyst (10 January 2003). A different set- of numbers, based on
different criteria, appears in InternationalStatistics, June 2004, and cites the total number
of personal insolvencies as 93,419. The difference appears to rest in the fact that the
2004 numbers excludes filings by individually owned businesses.
4. See International Statistics, supra note 1, at 7, and American Bankruptcy
Institute, Filing Statistics, Annual U.S. Filings, available at http://www.abiworld.org/
stats/1980annual.html (last visited'December 8, 2004). The US consumer insolvency
figures cover both ch. 7 and ch. 13 filings.
5. InternationalStatistics,supra note 1, at 4, 10.
6. Id. at 12, 13, 17-18. Note carefully that in the Insolvency Service statistics
individual insolvencies covers individual business and professional insolvencies as well
as consumer insolvencies.
7. The Times, April 9, 2004., p. 2 . There were 11, 967 individual insolvencies in the
third quarter of 2004 on an adjusted basis. This was an increase of 31.1% on the same
period in 2003.
There were 35,604 individual insolvencies altogether in 2003.
Department of Trade and Industry Homepage, DT, Statistics Release: Insolvencies in the
Third Quarter2004, 5 November 2004, and Table 2, IndividualInsolvencies in England
and Wales (seasonally adjusted), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/sd/insolv/ (last
visited December 8, 2004).
8. International Statistics, supra note 1, at 29.
The number of personal
bankruptcies amounted to 24,109 in administrative year 2001-2002, of which 20,039
were non-business bankruptcies. These figures do not include debt agreements and
arrangements under Parts IX and X of the Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act. See
additionally Jacob Ziegel, Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes (Oxford, Hart
Pblishing, 2003) [hereinafter Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes], Table 4.1 at
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grew from 0.50 to 1.21, an increase of 142%. 9 The number of personal
insolvencies grew to a further 22,637 during the 2002-3 administrative
year. 10
Looking at some non-common law jurisdictions, in Scotland the
number of individual sequestrations (i.e., individual insolvency
proceedings) jumped from 2,618 in the 1985/6 administrative year to 11,
970 in 1992/3 before dropping back substantially in later years for
reasons unrelated to the need for insolvency relief. In Germany, where
bankruptcy relief for consumers and other individuals only became
available as of 1999, 20,000 personal bankruptcy and small business
petitions were filed in the first full year of operations of the 1994 law
despite its very restrictive provisions; 44,000 petitions were filed in 2002
after the 2001 amendments to the law." Japan provides a still more
dramatic example of the impact of de facto insolvencies on the need for
legal solutions. According to a New York Times report, as many as 2
million Japanese were effectively bankrupt in 2002; another estimate put
the number at 1.5 million to 2 million. 12 Despite a less than favourable
bankruptcy law, individual bankruptcies in Japan increased from 160,741
in 2001 to 214,996 in 2002, or one person out of 587 in a population of
126 million. 13 The number of filings under a 2001 law introducing a
civil rehabilitation option doubled from 6,210 in the first year of its
operation to 13,498 in 2002.14
II.

Reasons for Rapid Growth in Number of Consumer Insolvencies

Insolvency essentially describes an individual's debt position and is
usually defined as the status of a person who cannot meet her liabilities
as they become due for payment or whose liabilities exceed her assets. 15
94.
9. See InternationalStatistics, supra note 1, at 32.
10. Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Annual Report by the InspectorGeneral in Bankruptcy on the Operation of the Bankruptcy Act 2002-2003, available at
http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/About%/*2OUs-%3EPublications%3EAnnual%20Documents/$FILE/I-G Annual2003.pdf?OpenElement
(last
visited
August 4, 2004), 14.
11. Jason J. Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States
(2004) 24 Nw J. INT LAW & Bus 257, at 286-87.
12. Mark D. West, Dying to Get Out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Suicide
in Japan, University of Michigan Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper
Series, Res. Paper No. 37, also accessible at http://ssrn.com/abstract'479844, at 3, 17.
13. Japan Information Center Corp, V. Increase in personal bankruptcies and
problems of multiple debts (2003), available at http://www.jicc.co.jp/f/f 05.html (last
visited August 3, 2004).
14. West, supra note 12, at 29.
15. Cf.Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), Canada, Rev. Stat. Can. 1985, c 31
(1st Suppl.), as am., s 2(1), definition of "insolvent person."
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Often the two tests coincide because an individual with readily realizable
assets can usually draw on a line of credit to meet current expenses.
However, so far as consumers are concerned, it is a safe assumption that
the second insolvency test, an excess of liabilities over assets, describes
the condition of most consumer insolvents. Consumer overindebtedness
is not, of course, a new phenomenon-it is encountered in all societies,
new and old, and at all levels of industrial development-so it is relevant
to ask, what are the particular circumstances that account for the rapid
growth in consumer insolvencies over the past twenty-five years in so
many industrialized societies around the globe? The most important
reasons appear to be the following:
1. Rapid growth in the use and availability of consumer credit.
Various forms of consumer credit-i.e., credit available for personal use
or consumption-have been available in most Western societies for over
a century. However, the credit was usually closely regulated by law and
was usually only available to well established employees with strong
credit records and to middle- and upper-income individuals. These
barriers were removed at different stages and at different tempos in the
post-World War II period as credit restrictions, usury ceilings and other
Similarly, large financial
legislative impediments were lifted.
institutions discovered that consumer credit was a safe and highly
profitable form of new business. The introduction of credit cards and the
heavy marketing of them, starting in the 1970s, also made a very
significant difference in the volume of outstanding credit. Credit cards
with a revolving line of credit ensure repeat business and encourage
compulsive shopping by consumers and a "consume now, pay later"
mentality in consumer expenditures. Not surprisingly, U.S. studies show
credit card debt
a close correlation between the volume of outstanding
16
and the growth in U.S. consumer bankruptcies.
Here again some statistics best describe the larger picture. The
volume of consumer credit in the U.S. grew from U.S. $390.3 billion in
1982 to U.S. $1,701 billion in 2001;" 7 the corresponding figures for
Canada were CAN. $139,710 million 8 and CAN $203,713 million. 19
Those for the United Kingdom rose from £36,290 million in 1987 to
£141,719 million in 2002.20 In Germany, the volume of outstanding
16. D. Ellis, The Influence of Legal Factors on PersonalBankruptcy Filings, Bank
Trends (February 1998), Number 98-03. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Division of Insurance (Washington D.C.).
17. InternationalStatistics, supra note 1, at 4.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Statistics Canada, Consumer Credit, Excluding Mortgages, available at
http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/fin20.htm (last visited August 4, 2004).
20. United Kingdom Office for National Statistics, 23.15 Consumer credit' National
Statistics Online, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/
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credit grew from DM 130,720 million in 1980 to DM 388,800 million in
1996,21 a 200 percent increase that substantially exceeded the population
growth during the same period. The Japanese figures are even more
striking. Here consumer credit grew from V166.9 billion in 1979 to V
681.3 billion in 2000, a 308% increase.22
2. Reduction in Savings by individuals andfamilies. Whether or
not it is a consequence of the rapid growth of consumer credit, observers
in the U.S., Canada and other countries have noted a disturbing and
steady increase of consumer indebtedness as a ratio of total disposable
after tax incomes. Equally troubling is a growing tendency for financial
institutions to encourage older couples to mortgage their home equity,
ostensibly to provide them with greater liquidity and a more comfortable
life style in their mature years.
3. Financialmismanagement by consumers and lack of financial
literacy. In commenting on the causes of consumer bankruptcy, trustees
in bankruptcy, financial counsellors, and credit grantors often claim that
debtor mismanagement of their finances and lack of budgetary skills is a
primary cause of consumer insolvencies. This conclusion is suspect
since it ignores the role which credit advertising and the general
marketing environment play in encouraging credit consumption.
Nevertheless, the widely held belief that credit mismanagement is the
primary cause of consumer over-indebtedness encouraged the Canadian
Parliament to add provisions in the 1992 amendments to Canada's
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) 23 making credit counselling
mandatory for consumer bankrupts and those debtors seeking approval of
a consumer proposal for reduction of their debts in an approved debt
repayment plan.
4. Impact of Unforeseen Circumstances. This congeries of events
covering such incidents as unemployment or reduced earnings by a
family breadwinner, demotion to a less remunerative job, family
problems, significant illness in the family, and large medical bills has
been given great prominence in the U.S. by the empirical research of
three leading researchers, Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook. Their
findings show that these factors greatly exceed in importance the other
asserted causes of consumer bankruptcies.24 Analyses of bankruptcy
Spreadsheets/D4925.xls (last visited August 4, 2004).
21.

Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, 136.

See also

European Credit Research Institute, Briefing on Consumer Credit, Indebtedness and
Overindebtednessin the EU (undated), http://www.ecri.be.

22. Japan Information Center Corp., supra note 13, at I.
23. See now BIA, s 157.1 and OSB Directive No 1R2 (21 December 1994).
24. See Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook, The FragileMiddle
Class: Americans in Debt (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 2000), as
summarized

in

Bankruptcyaction.com,

Bankruptcy

Profiles,

available

at
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causes in Canada, Australia and England suggest that illness and medical
bills play a much smaller role there than they do in the U.S., and this is
generally agreed to be because these countries have a much stronger
social safety net to protect insolvent debtors than is true in the U.S. On
the other hand, unemployment and family problems also figure
significantly in the Australian and Canadian statistics, though it may be
that in a substantial number of cases these factors also mask other
problems.
III.

Responding to Consumer Insolvencies

Historically, early societies responded very harshly to debtors who
were not able to meet their commitments. Under biblical and early
Roman law, commitment to slavery and even worse fates awaited
debtors and their families. Even as late as the 19 th century, creditors in
England and other common law jurisdictions were entitled to seek civil
imprisonment for delinquent debtors, and frequently did, as readers of
Charles Dickens' novels know only too well. This harsh remedy
reflected two attitudes. One was the belief that, unlike insolvent traders
whose misfortunes were ascribed to the vagaries of the marketplace and
other uncontrollable contingencies, non-traders were deemed to be the
authors of their own misfortune and therefore little deserving of
sympathy. The other attitude grew out of a sense of frustration. In the
absence of effective means for discovering and seizing debtors' assets,
creditors felt the need to resort to coercive methods like imprisonment in
the hope that payment would be offered by the debtor or by the debtor's
relatives and friends.
Insolvency law has travelled a long distance since those rather crude
and simplistic attitudes. There is a much better appreciation today that
personal insolvency and a failure to honour debt obligations do not in
themselves denote moral bankruptcy and serious character defects.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that a large number of civil law
jurisdictions-in Latin America, southern and eastern Europe, and the
Far East, for example-continue to deny insolvent debtors access to
bankruptcy proceedings or, if they do permit it, do not accompany it by
http://www.bankruptcyaction.com/USbankstats.htm (last visited August 3, 2004). Their
findings were as follows: average age: 38; 44% of filers are couples; 30% are women
filing alone; 26% are men filing alone; slightly better educated than the general
population; two out of three have lost a job; half have experienced a serious health
problem; and fewer than 9% have not suffered a job loss, medical event or divorce. For a
highly readable account of the problems many middle class American couples who have
accumulated mortgage and other debts premised on a steady two family income and
where one of the partners subsequently falls ill or loses her job, see ELIZABETH WARREN
AND AMELIA TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND

FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (New York. Basic Books. 2003).
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the prospect of offering the bankrupt immediate or eventual discharge of
the debtor's remaining debts.
This is in sharp contrast with the American "fresh start" philosophy.
This, at least since the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, has given
insolvent U.S. consumers ready access to the bankruptcy system and
more or less immediate discharge of the remaining debts on surrender of
the debtor's non-exempt assets. The underlying belief here is that the
debtor is a victim of unforeseen circumstances-unemployment, an
economic depression, sickness and such like-and that restoring the
debtor promptly as a productive member of society without the millstone
of perpetual indebtedness is as much in the community's interest as it is
in the interest of the debtor and his family.
Thus, broadly speaking, it may be said that modem bankruptcy
systems fall into three categories so far as their approach to consumer
insolvencies are concerned:
1. Jurisdictions that remain very conservative in their response to
consumer over-indebtedness;
2. Jurisdictions that adopt an ultra-liberal position of the American
"fresh start" variety; and
3. Jurisdictions that adopt a moderately liberal and qualified fresh
start policy. The Canadian, English and Australian insolvency
regimes belong to this group and, it would appear, so does the
Japanese regime as a result of the adoption of the 1999 Specified
Conciliation Law.
A.

A PreliminaryQuestion

The classification of modem consumer insolvency systems raises a
more basic question of the type of assistance that should be made
available to consumer debtors and at what point, and the philosophy
informing each of these approaches. These approaches too fall under
three principal headings, viz.:
1. Counselling facilities for overcommitted debtors coupled with
voluntary repayment plans;
2. Court supervised partial repayment plans followed by discharge of
the remaining debts. Consumer proposals in Canada, administration
orders and Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVAs) in England,
chapter 13 plans in the US, and creditor approved repayment plans
under the Japanese Conciliation Law fall into this category; and
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3. Regular or simplified bankruptcy proceedings coupled with
discharge of remaining debts either immediately (the US approach)
or after a minimum prescribed period coupled with an obligation by
the bankrupt to make surplus income payments up to the time of
discharge or for a fixed period (Canadian, English and Australian
approaches and, in a more attenuated form, the German approach as a
result of the 2001 amendments).
B.

Rationales of Different Approaches

The appropriateness of each of these approaches will depend on a
debtor's particular circumstances. A debtor experiencing only temporary
financial difficulties and enjoying a substantial discretionary income may
require little more than financial counselling and an extension of time by
creditors for repayment of the consumer's debts. On the other hand, a
debtor with more serious financial difficulties and with few prospects of
being able to pay off all the debts within a reasonable time frame, but
anxious to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy, will benefit from having
access to a statutory rehabilitation plan. Then, thirdly, there is the large
group of debtors with little or no discretionary income who are
For them, personal bankruptcy followed by
hopelessly insolvent.
discharge of the debts either at the conclusion of the proceedings or
within a few months thereafter, seems the obvious and indeed often the
only feasible solution assuming the debtors have not been guilty of active
misconduct.
C.

Rationales of U.S. Fresh Start Philosophy

What is striking about the American fresh start approach is that it
appears to offer the debtor the prospect of an immediate release from all
his dischargeable debts following the filing of the bankruptcy petition
and completion of the accompanying formalities regardless of his
particular circumstances and capacity to repay some or all of his debts.25
Many non-American observers are troubled by what they perceive to be
an excessively generous or naive approach and see it as an invitation for
abuses by unscrupulous debtors.26 However, this view is not shared by
25. The US position may change radically if, as seems likely as of this writing
(March 2005), US credit industry's seven year to persuade Congress to adopt a means
testing law for debtors seeking to take advantage of chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code
is finally crowned with success. S.256 was easily approved by the Senate on March 11,
2005 and the predictions are that the House of Representatives will follow suit.
26. Note, however, that pursuant to 11 USC 707(b) and Bankruptcy Rules, Rule
1017(e), the U.S. bankruptcy court has power to dismiss an abusive bankruptcy petition.
Until recently such motions were rare, one of the reasons being that only the court acting
on its own initiative and the US trustee could bring such a motion. However, acting in
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most American bankruptcy scholars and many bankruptcy judges, and
they offer one or27more of the following rationales in support of the fresh
start philosophy:
1. That to impound a consumer bankrupt's future income would
violate the 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution against
involuntary servitude.
2. That a coercive payment regime will provoke the consumer's
resistance and encourage the consumer to change jobs or otherwise
become less productive, and perhaps even to disappear completely.
3. That it is much better to secure the debtor's consent to a voluntary
payment system by giving the debtor incentives that are not available
in a straight bankruptcy than to coerce him to make involuntary
payments.
4. That the British-style income payment and discretionary discharge
system is based on the historical role of the British insolvency
legislation as a creditors' debt collection instrument. This was not
true (it is argued) of the American National Bankruptcy Act of 1898
because pre-bankruptcy debt collection rules generally fall under
state jurisdiction.28
5. That a British-style income payment and discretionary discharge
system is intrusive, paternalistic, and subjective since no two debtors
and their families have the same needs and face the same
circumstances.29
6. That to attempt to engraft a means test on what is already a very
complex and overburdened US consumer bankruptcy system would
be the straw that breaks the camel's back.30
7. That since the bulk of consumer bankruptcy debts today consist of
consumer credit liabilities, it is more efficient to oblige the credit
response to creditors' criticisms, US trustees in various districts appear to have become
more active in initiating such proceedings.
27. Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, 69.
28. See D.G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional,and Suspended Discharges in AngloAmerican Bankruptcy Proceedings131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 121 (1982).
29. Id. at 120-123; and J. Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code,
Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANR. L.J. 501, 583 (1993) (eloquently expressing similar

sentiments without allusion to the British style provisions), cited in E Warren, A
PrincipledApproach to Consumer Bankruptcy 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 505 (1997).
30. E. Warren, supra note 29, at 505-506. The metaphor is the author's, not Prof.
Warren's.
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industry to intemalise its losses or to tighten its credit granting
standards if creditors believe their losses are too high than to expect
consumers to resist the impulse for instant3gratification encouraged
by the ready availability of consumer credit. 1
8. That there is no evidence of large scale abuses in the existing
bankruptcy system and that the overwhelming percentage of those
seeking chapter 7 bankruptcy protection are hopelessly insolvent and
would not be able to pay off their indebtedness in any reasonable
time frame even if means testing and a mandatory chapter 13 regime
were to be introduced.32
D. The Ongoing U.S. Debate
Since 1997, efforts have been made by the powerful U.S. credit
industry to persuade Congress to adopt legislation that would deny
bankruptcy relief to those debtors deemed capable of paying a substantial
percentage of their debts (20 percent is a popular figure) over a five year
period. Congress actually approved such legislation in 2000 but
President Clinton pocket vetoed the bill as one of his last acts in office.33
A successor bill has won the endorsement of each of the Houses of
Congress but as of this writing (July 2004) remains frozen in committee
because of fierce opposition by one or two Congresspersons and their
determination to amend the bill to promote other non-bankruptcy
objectives.34
It is in any event important to recognize that what current U.S. law
offers insolvent debtors is only a "qualified" fresh start and not an
absolutely clean slate. This is because there are no less than 18
exceptions to the right to an unconditional discharge under the present
Bankruptcy Code.35 In addition, many American debtors enter into
reaffirmation agreements with creditors agreeing to pay their debts even
after statutory discharge of the debts. Then, too, debtors in all states
must surrender their non-exempt assets to the trustee at the time of
bankruptcy. The exemptions vary widely among the states and this too is

3 1. T.H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (Harvard University
Press, 1986) ch. 10, at 234-236.
32. T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren and J.L. Westbrook, Consumer Bankruptcy in the
United States: A Study ofAlleged Abuse and of Local Legal Cultures 20 J. CONS. POL'Y

223 (1997).
33.

Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 58-60.

34. However, the prospects may have greatly improved with President Bush's reelection as President in November 2004 and with a substantial increase in the number of
elected Republican Senators.
35. Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 80-81.
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the subject of much controversy among the federal legislators.3 6
E. The Fresh Start Policy in Other Common Law Jurisdiction
In England, the principle of a debtor's entitlement to a discharge of
his debts in bankruptcy was first recognized in the Bankruptcy Act of
1883. However, it was a long way removed from the American fresh
start rule. In particular, the English discharge was subject to the
following important qualifications. First, the discharge was in the
discretion of the court and, in addition to denying the discharge
altogether, the court could issue a conditional or suspended discharge.
Second, the debtor had to apply for the discharge and creditors were
entitled to oppose it. In the third place, the debtor could be required to
make voluntary or court mandated payments to the trustees pursuant to
37
agreement or a court order (income payment order (IPO)).
Significantly, the English legislation contained no formula for
determining the amount of the IPO but left it to the court's discretion
subject to the debtor being left with sufficient income to meet the
debtor's essential expenditures for himself, his family and other
dependents.
Important amendments to the discharge provisions were adopted in
the English Insolvency Act of 1986.38 First time bankrupts were now
entitled to an automatic discharge, after three years in the case of regular
bankruptcies and after two years in the case of summary administrations.
Further changes arrived with the enactment of the Enterprise Act
2002. 39 The basic discharge period has now been reduced to one year
and may be shortened still further if the Official Receiver files a notice
that investigation of the bankrupt is unnecessary or that investigation of
the bankrupt has been concluded.40 Non-British readers may be
surprised to learn that these amendments were prompted not by a
concern to meet the needs of the growing number of over-indebted
Rather, they were inspired by the British
British consumers.
government's wish to encourage a stronger enterprise culture in the
British population.41
The Canadian discharge system offers still another version of a
modified fresh start policy. Prior to 1992, the Canadian bankruptcy
36.

Id. at 63-65.

37. Id. at 117. In practice, an IPO appears to have been made in about 10 percent of
the cases, id, Table 5.2 at 118.
38. Id. at 118-19; Insolvency Act 1986, s 279(1).
39. EnterpriseAct 2002 (U.K.), 2000, c. 40.
40. Id. at s 256(1), amending Insolvency Act 1986, s. 279(1).
41. See Secretary of State. for Trade and Industry, Productivity and Enterprise.
Insolvency-A Second Chance (London, Cm 5234, July 2001).
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legislation basically mirrored the pre-1986 British approach to the
debtor's entitlement to a discharge. Amendments in 1992 to the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) 42 entitle first time bankrupts to an
automatic discharge nine months from the date of the bankruptcy order
unless the discharge is opposed by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, the
trustee in bankruptcy or the debtor's creditors. In the latter event, the
court is free to make such order as it deems appropriate. In practice,
there are few objections to the debtor's discharge.
Another and still more important change in the Canadian position
was introduced in 199743 dealing with the debtor's obligation to make
surplus income payments during the bankruptcy period and prior to the
debtor's discharge. The pre-1997 practice was to leave it to the trustee's
discretion to reach an appropriate agreement with the debtor although the
trustees were expected to follow the surplus income guidelines provided
by the Superintendent. The 1997 amendments made it obligatory for the
bankrupt to make surplus income payments to the trustee in accordance
with a "low income cut off' (LICO) table prepared annually by the
Superintendent. 44 The results from the first three years of operation of
the new surplus income regime are instructive and also throw important
light on the soundness of the U.S. style fresh start policy. In the period
1998-2001, the surplus income of Canadian individual bankrupts varied
from 16.94% in 1998 to 19.88% in 2001. 45 The size of the surplus
payments made by the bankrupts varied widely among the provinces.
Nationwide, 55.6% of the payments were below CAN $200; the mean
amount was CAN $240.16 and the median figure CAN $180 per
month.46
F.

Scandinavian and ContinentalEuropeanApproaches

The approach of the continental European countries, including the
Nordic countries, to the treatment of consumer over-indebtedness lies at
the opposite end of the spectrum to the liberal discharge policies adopted
in common law jurisdictions-not just the United States but equally
those of Canada, Australia, and England. The reasons for this disparity
rest partly in legal history and partly in the restricted role that consumer
credit has played, and perhaps still plays, in these countries. For a long
time, bankruptcy was not, and in many cases still is not, an option for
42.

SC 1992, c. 27, s. 61(1), adding s 168.l(l)(f) to the parent Act.

43.

Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 28, and BIA s. 68

as revised in 1997.
44. Note importantly that the bankrupt is only obliged to pay 50% of the surplus
income as determined in accordance with the Superintendent's directive.
45. Comparative ConsumerInsolvency Regimes, supra note 8, Table 2.1, at 32.
46. Id. at 31.
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consumers in Western Europe. Where the remedy was available, unpaid
debts survived the bankruptcy process for as much as thirty years. Even

now, nearly twenty years after legislative relaxation of the old
shibboleths, consumer access to a right of discharge remains difficult and
Dr. Niemi-Kiesilainen reminds us in her
heavily circumscribed.
excellent survey of the European legislative developments 47 that there are

three basic differences between the Scandinavian, continental European
and common law approaches. Thus, in all the European legislation
examined by her (a) access is restricted to debtors deemed deserving of

assistance; (b) all of them require a mandatory payment plan of from 5 to
7 years and there are no facilities for an automatic discharge; 48 and (c) all
of them place special emphasis on debt counselling services provided by
a variety of state-sponsored or state-funded social agencies. Their dual
role is to help the consumer draw up a debt adjustment plan and to
mediate its acceptance by creditors, and to wean debtors away from the

use of consumer credit and to live in the future on a balanced and,
usually, very tight budget.
Even these modest changes in European attitudes might not have
come about but for the rapid increase in the number of overcommitted
consumer debtors in the 1980 and 1990s. 49 Before the 1970s and 1980s,
most of the continental countries restricted the availability of consumer
credit through various controls. Demand exceeded supply and defaults
were rare.f ° Since then, the volume of consumer credit and/or household
credit has grown rapidly, though not at an even rate. The UK figures
were cited earlier. 51 In Germany, consumer credit increased from 15
billion ECU in 1970 to 200 billion ECU in 1998. As a percentage of

47. J. Niemi-Kiesilainen, The Role of Consumer Counselling as Part of the
Bankruptcy Process in Europe (1999) 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409 [hereinafter
Counselling]; J. Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison:Do We Cure a
Market Failure or a Social Problem? (1999) 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 473 [hereinafter
Developments]; J. Niemi-Kiesilainen, Collective or Individual? Constructions of Debtors
and Creditors in Consumer Bankruptcy in J. Niemi-Kiesilainen, IDC Ramsay and W.C.
Whitford (eds), CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, (Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2003) ch. 2.
48. "All European bills emphasize that the law must not undermine the general
moral imperative of paying one's debts." Niemi-Kiesilainen, ibid. Developments, at 482.
49. "Debtors" is used here in the sense commonly employed by sociologists, viz.
individuals with accumulated debts. A substantial number of the chapters in U. REIFNER
AND J. FORD (EDS), BANKING FOR PEOPLE (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1992) contain a detailed
examination of the state of indebtedness in various European countries, especially among
low-income consumers. For a later study, see EU Directorate-General for Health and
Consumer Protection, Study of the Problem of Consumer Indebtedness: Statistical
Aspects, FinalReport (Brussels, October 2001) [hereinafter Consumer Indebtedness].
50. Niemi-Kiesilainen, Developments, supra note 47, at 480. For an excellent
description of the German position, see also Kilborn, supra note 11.
51. United Kingdom Office for National Statistics, supra note 20.
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PDI, average indebtedness grew from 15% in 1978 to 25% in 1997.52
G. Complexities of ContinentalRules: German Insolvenzordnung 1994
The complexities of many of the Nordic and Western European
consumer insolvency regimes may be gauged from the following
description of the rules appearing in the German insolvency law of 1994.
The original report of the Commission established by the German
government in the 1980s to present proposals for revising the century old
German insolvency laws did not include recommendations for dealing
with consumer problems and a discharge facility was only provided for
business debtors. Strong pressure by consumer groups and the support of
the Social Democratic opposition party led to amendments being adopted
for consumer debt relief during debate on the bill in 1991. The law was
approved in 1994 but only became operative at the beginning of 1999.
The law adopted a two-track procedure for the relief of consumer
debtors. The first, governed by Article 304, involved a debt adjustment
plan; the second was a bankruptcy proceeding, falling under Article 286,
which, if all went well, might conclude after an interlude of 7 or more
years with the discharge of any remaining debts. Under the debt
adjustment procedure, the debtor was obliged to negotiate with the
creditors and present them with a plan. The plan had to be approved by
half the creditors in number and value but a secured creditor could not be
bound without its consent. The plan also required court approval and,
when that had been obtained, an insolvency manager had to be appointed
to collect and distribute the payments and supervise the plan.
The bankruptcy procedure was apparently based on different
principles and involved the debtor being required to pay his attachable
income for up to 7 years to a trustee-manager for distribution to the
creditors followed by discharge of any remaining debt if the debtor had
observed all the requirements of the Law. Importantly, the Article 286
procedure also had a preliminary phase requiring the debtor and his
creditors to engage in serious negotiations about the terms and amounts
of the payments to individual creditors. 53 It also envisaged the
possibility of the payment plan involving all of the debtor's family with
the prospect of reducing the seven year period if other members of the
household contributed payments.54
The new Law encountered substantial teething troubles in its first
52. Udo Reifner, Consumer Lending and Overindebtedness Among German
Consumer Households, Expert Report to the European Commission (Hamburg, 27 March
1998) [hereinafter Expert Report] at 475.
53. Id. at 85-86.
54. Id. at 83.
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year of operation. Apparently, only 13% of the applications for debt
release led to approved payment plans. Some of the difficulties were the
following: 55 there was a long waiting list for the obligatory debt
counselling mandated by the legislation; attorneys were not entitled to
sufficiently high fees to be attracted to offer their services; some judges
believed that the debtor had to be in a position to repay a minimum
amount of the debt to be entitled to enroll in a plan; and major creditors
were being uncooperative in the negotiation of payment plans. The debt
in Article 304ff were also criticised on the following
release provisions
56
grounds:
1. The costs of the procedure had to be home by the debtor. Since
many debtors could not afford to pay, even with legal aid, they were
excluded from access to debt relief altogether.
2. The procedure was too complex and could lead to the proceedings
being terminated without the debtor's participation.
3. The duration of the procedure-a minimum of 7 years57-was
much too long, especially when account is taken of the financial
hardship suffered by the debtor during this period as well as the
debtor's obligation to comply with numerous duties.
4. The Law was regressive insofar as it required the debtor to accept
any offer of work even if totally unsuitable for the debtor.
5. The Law took no account of creditors' responsibility for the
debtor's over-indebtedness. Banks were also given unfair priority
treatment over other creditors' claims and, in particular, were entitled
to continue to attach the debtor's earnings.
6. The Law was demeaning to debtors and deprived them of their
dignity as human beings.
7. The law operated unfairly against guarantors of the debtor. They
could be sued by the debtor's creditors but had no right of recourse
against the debtor. This meant that other members of the debtor's
55.

The information is taken from an email to the author from Dr. Reifner (6

December 1999).

56. Reifner, Expert Report, supra note 52, at 86-88. See also U. Reifner, The
Eleventh Commandment: Inclusive Contract Law and Personal Bankruptcy in NIEMIKIESILAINEN,
PERSPECTIVE,

57.
years.

RAMSAY
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WHITFORD,
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supra note 47.
In practice, after allowing for an initial waiting period, it could be as long as 10
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family, and divorced or separated spouses, could suffer great
hardships and might themselves have to seek bankruptcy relief.
The rigidities of the 1994 provisions were substantially relaxed in
2001 amendments to the German law. Nevertheless, the amendments
retained the principle of the debtor's obligation to make payment from
surplus income for six years, to accept any type of employment offered
to the debtor, and emphatic rejection of the painless U.S.-style fresh start
philosophy. It seems, however, that the 2001 amendments have led to a
very significant increase in the number of consumers seeking debt
58
relief.
H. Relationship of Debt Repayment Plans to StraightBankruptcy
Proceedings
The preceding description of the current German approach to
consumer insolvencies (which is reasonably representative of the
approach adopted in many other Western European countries) raises a
basic question of the appropriate relationship between negotiated and
creditor approved repayment plans and bankruptcy proceedings resulting
in a discharge of the debtor's unpaid debts. Generally speaking, in
common law jurisdictions it is left up to the debtor to make the
appropriate choice between these alternatives. It is assumed the debtor
will opt for the type of relief best suited to her particular circumstances
and that the state should not make the decision for her.5 9 It is felt to be
better to build sufficient incentives into the repayment regime for the
debtor to opt for it in the expectation that a self-directed decision will
produce better results than a coerced decision made for the debtor. This
perception is supported by experience in Canada and the U.S. of high
rates of failure in voluntary repayment plans: as high as 70 percent in the
U.S. for chapter 13 plans and about a third in Canada for consumer
proposals.
As noted, the continental European approach proceeds from the
premise that the debtor should always be obliged to make payments for
long periods of time before "earning" the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy, so there is no hesitation about building a mandatory

58. See Kilborn, supra note 11.
59. However, there is much evidence in the U.S. and Canada that "local culture" in
the form of attorneys and bankruptcy judges (U.S.A.) and trustees in bankruptcy,
creditors (sometimes) and bankruptcy judges (Canada) will often influence a debtor's
decision. Note too that pursuant to s.170(2)(c) of the BIA, the trustee, in filing the
trustee's report at the time of the debtor's eligibility for discharge, must indicate whether,
in the trustee's opinion, the debtor could have made a viable proposal instead of opting
for the bankruptcy route.
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repayment plan into the overall insolvency scheme. It could also be
argued that the Commonwealth countries' approach is not that different
from the continental structure since the Canadian, English and Australian
legislation all require the debtor to turn over surplus income for varying
periods before earning the right to a discharge. Given this feature, it
seems but a small step for the legislation to provide that the administrator
may refuse a bankruptcy remedy altogether if she forms the view that the
debtor had the resources to enter into a voluntary repayment plan and
was unreasonable in refusing to do so. The argument also derives
substantial support from the philosophy informing all the recent
Congressional bills. As previously noted, their common theme is that a
debtor should be denied access to a chapter 7 discharge if the debtor's
financial statement shows that the debtor could have repaid a given
percentage of the debts over a five year period after allowing for
prescribed cost of living expenses.
I.

The Future of the Fresh Start Philosophy

The preceding survey will have shown that so far no other
country--common law or civil law in orientation-has evinced serious
interest in following the U.S. lead in granting a consumer bankrupt the
right to an immediate discharge without regard to his earning capacity
and subject only to surrendering his existing non-exempt assets. In the
U.S. itself, the fresh start philosophy is under deep assault by the finance
industry and presumably the lobbyists' efforts will continue regardless of
the fate of the bills currently before Congress.
To non-American observers, many of the rationalizations of the
fresh start philosophy seem fragile. Nevertheless, its underlying theme
appears to have left its imprint on many of the more recent non-U.S.
insolvency regimes in recognizing the need for more generous discharge
provisions in the face of the rapidly escalating number of overcommitted
debtors and the futility of making impecunious debtors walk the plank
for up to six years to satisfy Calvinist notions of a responsible debtor.
The reduced discharge periods in Canada and England-nine months in
the former and a year or less in the latter-essentially reflect this reality.
It is also important to stress the very modest results of the surplus
income payment requirements in the countries that have adopted them as
a condition of the debtor's eligibility for discharge. In England, income
payment orders in recent years have only been made in about ten percent
of the personal bankruptcies; in Canada, the overall percentage of
bankrupts with surplus income as determined under the statutory BIA
formula varied from 16.94% to 19.06% in the period between 1998 and
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2001 .60 However, the actual benefits to an estate from surplus payments
is often negligible. For example, in one sample of 900 summary
administration files, pay outs only amounted to an average of
CAN $103.13 and 3.6% of total receipts, or 0.4% as a percentage of
receipts from all 900 files.
IV. Other Aspects of Modem Consumer Insolvency Systems
The discharge of debts provisions and the introduction of debt
repayment plans as an alternative to the bankruptcy solution constitute
only a small, albeit very important, part of the larger insolvency picture.
Space only permits me to indicate a few of the many other issues facing
modem policy makers.
A.

Accessibility of Bankruptcy Relief

In many jurisdictions-England, Germany and Japan are good
examples--debtors have often been denied access to the bankruptcy
system because the legal and related expenses are well beyond the
debtor's pocket. In England, a petitioner must deposit the sum of £250
to cover the administrative costs of the Insolvency Service as well as a
court filing fee of £120 before the petition will be accepted. 61 This
financial hurdle explains in large part why the English personal
bankruptcy rate is so low. In both Germany and Japan, it seems,
petitioners face the prospect of high attorney fees, which may run to
several thousand dollars. The Canadian position is different. In Canada,
bankruptcy assignments are overwhelmingly handled by licensed trustees
and they have solved the fee problem by their willingness to accept a
small down payment and the debtor's promise to pay the balance of the
trustee's fee and expenses (approx. CAN $1,750) by installments.6 2
However, the arrangement has encountered significant legal and other
difficulties and the future of such instalment arrangements is uncertain.63
It is not clear how indigent debtors solve the problem of access to
the U.S. bankruptcy system since it is now well established that a
debtor's pre-bankruptcy promise to pay the attorney's fees is not
enforceable once bankruptcy has intervened. Instead, the attorney must
file a proof of claim like all other creditors. Because of the detail and
60. Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 35, n.99.
61. Id. at 115.
62. For the details see Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8,
20; see also Niemi-Kiesilainen, supra note 47, and sources cited therein.
63. See J.S. Ziegel, Financing Consumer Bankruptcies, Re Berthelette, and Public
Policy (2000) 33 CAN. Bus. L.J. 294, and J.S. Ziegel, Indigent Debtors and Financial
Accessibility of Consumer Insolvency Regimes, ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW,
2004, p 499.
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complexity of the documents required to accompany the petition, it is
difficult for debtors to complete the documents themselves.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a small but not insignificant number of
pro se filers who complete the petition themselves, aided in some cases
by pro bono lawyers or legal service clinics.
In terms of simplicity and accessibility to insolvent debtors, the
Australian model is surely the best. The bankruptcy petition and
supporting statement of affairs are easy to complete and no court hearing
or filing fees are involved. Instead, the debtor can mail in the petition or
lodge it by hand at one of the ITSA offices across Australia. If the
documentation is in order and the debtor is not ineligible to file for
bankruptcy, the Official Receiver must accept the petition and
bankruptcy follows automatically. 64 Unless the debtor has retained the
services of a registered (i.e., private trustee) (very unlikely in practice),
following the bankruptcy order the debtor's estate will be administered
by the Official Receiver, again free of charge to the debtor. Most
consumer bankruptcy cases handled by ITSA are "no asset" cases and so
can be handled very expeditiously and at low cost by the ITSA officials.
B.

Exempted Property

Even the most indigent of debtors must be left with sufficient
clothing, household equipment and furniture to maintain some semblance
of dignity and comfort for himself and his family and, where relevant,
with tools and equipment to continue plying his trade or profession.
Historically, the exemptions in England were barely at the subsistence
level and were severely limited in value. The "one size fits all" standard
has been abandoned in the current English Insolvency Act and has been
replaced by a "necessary" standard appropriate to the debtor's
circumstances. 65 Accordingly, s. 283(2) of the English Act entitles the
debtor to retain:
(a) such tools, books, vehicles and other items of equipment as are
necessary to the bankrupt for use personally by him in his
employment, business or vocation;
(b) such clothing, bedding, furniture, household equipment and
provisions as are necessary for satisfying the basic domestic needs of
the bankrupt and his family.

64. Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 97, and the
excellent article by Thomas G.W. Telfer, The Proposed Federal Exemption Regime for
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (2005) 41 CAN. Bus. L.J. 279.
65. Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 116.
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In case of dispute, the decision of what is necessary to meet the
debtor's needs is made by the trustee with a right of appeal to the
bankruptcy judge. Reported English judgments appear to indicate that in
practice the courts err on the side of generosity.
Other insolvency regimes, civil law and common law, appear to
have retained the model of an itemized list of exemptions with individual
monetary ceilings. This is generally true in Canada and the U.S. In
Canada, exemption levels continued to be governed by provincial law
although the federal government has been urged to exercise its
bankruptcy power to impose a uniform exemptions standard for all
personal bankruptcies. The provincial exemption levels vary widely,
with the Prairie provinces' debtor oriented provisions being the most
generous and those of the Maritime provinces the least generous. Even
greater disparity in exemption levels is found among the American
states, particularly in the treatment of the debtor's residence, where the
exempted amount may range from a few thousand dollars to total
exemption of the debtor's home. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code attempted
to provide a minimum floor of exemptions for all debtors by entitling the
debtor to choose between the state exemptions and the Code provided
exemptions.66 However, the drafter's good intentions were thwarted
when most of the states decided to exclude the optional federal standards,
which is what the Code entitles them to do.
An important feature that appears to divide North American
jurisdictions from overseas countries is the treatment of the debtor's
residence, or "homestead" as it is often referred to in the North American
legislation. Overwhelmingly, most of the American states and the
Canadian provinces grant some form of exemption in this area but, as
already noted, the exemption varies enormously in value. The inequities
of these disparities from the debtors' and creditors' points of view have
often been noted, but legislators in both countries have so far been
The English and Australian
unable to resolve it satisfactorily.
bankruptcy legislation contains no explicit exemptions for residences
though it seems that in England the bankrupt and his family may be
afforded protection from being ousted from the family home for a
reasonable period of time.6 7 On the face of it, allowing the bankrupt
debtor to retain a generous equity in the family home may be unfair to
the debtor's creditors. However, those who subscribe to this position
overlook the fact that the psychic harm to the debtor and his family of
being forced to move into rented accommodation in an entirely different
66. 11 USC § 522(b). See also Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes, supra
note 8, at 63-65.
67. See Insolvency Act (Eng.), as amended, s 283(2).
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area, and the associated costs of the move, may more than offset any
pecuniary benefits to the creditors. In most cases, a debtor's equity in
the home is quite modest. It is only in those jurisdictions where the
homestead exemption is very high (or subject to no ceiling at all) that the
debtor will choose not to use his equity as collateral for a loan to help
pay off his existing indebtedness.
Another exemption issue that is currently attracting much attention
in Canada is the treatment of various types of pension plans. Federal and
provincial pension legislation exempts employment related pension plans
from seizure in or outside bankruptcy. Its proponents argue that the
exemption should also extend to voluntary savings plans such as the
Registered Retirement Savings Plan recognized under Canada's federal
tax legislation on the ground that the state should encourage taxpayers to
make provision for their sunset years.6 8 There are two weaknesses about
this reasoning. One is that the proposed exemption is unfair to low
income debtors whose discretionary income is too small to enable them
to set up a private pension plan, yet who are still expected to make
payments to the trustee. The other is that it proves too much. If private
pensions are exempted then so, it may be argued, should a debtor's
equity in his home, and that exemption should be more generous than the
limits currently provided for in most provincial legislation. This is
because for most debtors the home represents the largest single
investment and nest egg for their retirement years.
C. Reaffirmations and Non-DischargeableDebts
These two topics are quite disparate but, in the interest of space, it is
convenient to treat them together. A reaffirmation involves the question
whether a debtor should be free to reaffirm pre-bankruptcy obligations
following the debtor's discharge or whether such post-bankruptcy
agreements need to be carefully regulated to avoid abuses. The
proponents argue that regulation is necessary and that without this
protection debtors may easily lose the benefits of a statutory discharge.
American experience shows 69 that these concerns are well founded.
Canadian case law also illustrates that debtors will frequently reaffirm a
pre-bankruptcy contract-for example, by retaining a leased vehicle even
after the debtor's discharge-without appreciating the legal
consequences of their conduct. Most common law jurisdictions have no
clear rules governing reaffirmation of pre-discharge obligations and so,
at a minimum, the case for statutory clarification of the position is very

68.

ComparativeConsumer Insolvency Regimes, supra note 8, at 24.

69.

Id. at 88-89.
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strong.
Pre-bankruptcy debts and obligations that are non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy raise a very different set of issues. The non-dischargeable
debts and obligations are invariably spelled out in the legislation and,
though there may be problems of construction, the basic position is clear
enough.
What is highly contentious are the types of debts and
obligations that should be non-dischargeable and the policy that
determines their choice. The answers vary widely even among common
law jurisdictions. The Canadian BIA contains eight non-dischargeable
types of debts and obligations compared to five each for Australia and
England and a whopping eighteen for the United States!7 ° It seems
consistent with public policy that criminal penalties should not be
dischargeable in bankruptcy but it is not as obvious that the same status
should be accorded to unpaid taxes-they are dischargeable under the
Canadian, British and Australian acts but not under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. Should the answer to this question rest on the debtor's motivation
in failing to meet his civic obligations or does it rest on the sense of
unfairness that other taxpayers should have to shoulder the extra burden
of the bankrupt's delinquent taxes? Could the same argument not be
made as well about many other types of debt? The treatment of alimony
and family support obligations raises another set of difficult questions.
They are not dischargeable in the above-mentioned jurisdictions, except
in Australia, where the court may grant relief from payments that are in
arrear, 7 1 and in England, where s.281(5) of the Insolvency Act permits
the court to grant release from a family support or maintenance debt "to
such extent and on such conditions" as the court may direct. The high
incidence of unpaid family support obligations suggests that public
policy in this area may be easier to enunciate than to enforce.
D. Prophylacticsand Creditors' Accountability
A well designed and balanced insolvency system will be concerned
not only to provide relief to overcommitted debtors but also to put
mechanisms in place to discourage over-indebtedness to begin with.
Here the tendency is to put the burden on the debtors to acquire the skills
and discipline for proper budget management either through their own
exertions or with the help of high school instruction or credit counselling

70. Id. at Table 2.4, 42-44. Student loans constitute a separate and even more
controversial category and are often dealt with in separate legislation. For the Canadian
treatment, see id. at 129. (At the time of this writing, a private member's bill in pending
in the Canadian House of Commons to reduce the non-dischargeability period for student
loans from ten years to two years.).
71. Cwth. Bankruptcy Act, s. 153(2), (2A).
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facilities. As previously noted, the Canadian Act does in fact oblige
bankrupts to receive some elementary counselling as a condition of their
discharge from bankruptcy. However, the available evidence appears to
show that the statutory imposed counselling makes little difference to the
debtors' postdischarge credit rating.72 It is also unclear whether this is
because the course of instruction is too short to change basic attitudes
and expenditure patterns or whether it is because saturation credit

advertising and the easy availability of credit cards quickly offsets the
benefits of counselling.
It is striking however that North American legislation in general

imposes no legal obligations on creditors to exercise prudence and
restraint in the granting of credit except so far as the discipline may be
imposed ex post following the discharge of a debtor from monies owing
to a creditor. This is a crude approach and tars a careful credit grantor
with the same brush as the lax creditor whose high interest rates and
generous profit margins allow it to absorb higher losses. It seems that,
under the prodding of the British government, financial institutions and
other major credit grantors have agreed to screen credit applicants more
carefully and to adopt standards of prudential conduct but it is not clear
how these can be effectively enforced in practice without credible
sanctions.73 In any event, these initiatives have no counterpart in North
America and offers of unsolicited credit cards and beguiling offers of
credit for the acquisition of goods and services with no down payment
and no repayments for a year or more continue to flourish despite the
high insolvency rates in Canada and the U.S. The U.S. credit card
industry has even opposed suggestions for modest disclosure
requirements in monthly statements that would tell the credit card holder
how long it would take him to pay off the current balance on the credit
card at the minimum rate prescribed by the credit card agreement.

72. See Saul Schwartz, Effect of Bankruptcy Counseling on Future
Creditworthiness:Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2003) 77 ABLJ 257 (showing
that a comparison of Canadian consumer bankrupts pre-1993 who had not received
counseling with post-1993 bankrupts, who had not received it, showed no statistically
significant differences in their credit ratings.).
73. Of particular interest in this context is the Swiss Federal Law on Consumer
Credit of March, 2001, available at http://www.ofj.admin.ch/f/index.html (last visited
February 6, 2005). The Law requires creditors to exercise prudence in extending credit to
new consumers, to report extensions of credit to a central registry as well as significant
default in payments by debtors, and imposes strong sanctions for non-compliance by
creditors. See esp. Section 5 and Article 32. (I am indebted to Professor Bernd Stauder
of the University of Geneva for drawing my attention to this legislation and providing me
with a copy of it.)
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Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to explain the principal reasons for
the rapid growth in many industrialized societies in the number of overindebted consumers and the diverse approaches adopted in consumer
insolvency regimes to address these challenges. The variations in
philosophy and techniques range from those conservative systems
primarily committed to educating debtors to handling their own and their
family's finances more responsibly, and granting discharge from unpaid
debts only as a last resort, to ultra liberal and moderately liberal regimes
accepting the need for a prompt or reasonably early discharge with a
view to returning the debtor as a productive and self-respecting member
of society. The American fresh start philosophy represents the most
generous approach but it has found few exact imitators anywhere else.
However, it has influenced a general tendency in many countries to relax
earlier stringent preconditions to the granting of a discharge and the
imposition of post-discharge disqualifications and restrictions.
The framing of an appropriate discharge policy and the design of
effective non-bankruptcy rehabilitational schemes constitute only a part
of the much larger number of issues which must be addressed by modern
consumer insolvency regimes. These issues run the gamut from
providing consumers ready access to the insolvency system to the
questions of the types of debts and obligations that should be nondischargeable and under what circumstances the law should recognize
the debtor's reaffirmation of pre-bankruptcy debts.
This survey has also tried to make it clear that none of the above
questions should be approached abstractly. Rather, they should be
grounded in sound empirical research of the actual impact of current
rules and an appreciation that consumer insolvencies involve
multidisciplinary phenomena. A priori assumptions and sweeping
generalizations need always to be tested against the available data and
policy makers and legislators should resist the temptation to moralize
about the weaknesses of overindebted consumers.
Finally but not least, the paper draws attention to the important role
played by the consumer credit industry in contributing to the overindebtedness phenomenon and the need, at least in common law
jurisdictions, to devise much stronger incentives for the credit industry to
police its own credit practices more rigorously than has been true up to
now.

